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Abstract As we enter the 2020s, global poverty is still a grave and persistent prob-
lem. Alleviating and eradicating poverty within and across the world’s societies 
requires a thorough understanding of its nature and extent. Although economists 
still standardly measure absolute and relative poverty in monetary terms, a consen-
sus is emerging that poverty is a socially relational problem involving deprivations 
in multiple dimensions, including health, standard of living, education and political 
participation. The anthology Dimensions of Poverty advances the interdisciplinary 
debate on multidimensional poverty, and features contributions from leading inter-
national experts and early career researchers (including from the Global South). 
This introductory chapter gives an overview of formative debates, central concepts 
and key findings. While monetary poverty measures are still dominant in public and 
academic debate, their explanatory power has been drawn into question. We discuss 
relevant criticisms before outlining the normative concepts that can inform both 
multidimensional poverty and monetary measures, including basic capabilities, 
basic needs and social primary goods. Next, we introduce several influential multi-
dimensional poverty indices, including the Human Development Index and the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index. The anthology shows in detail how such measures 
can be improved, from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. It shows that there are 
different methods of poverty research that require further investigation, including 
participatory studies, (value) surveys, public consensus building, the constitutional 
approach, and financial diaries. Finally, we show that there is an ongoing problem 
2of epistemic asymmetries in global poverty research, and discuss responsibility for 
addressing poverty, including the responsibilities of academics. The remainder of 
the chapter is dedicated to a more detailed preview of the volume’s 20 contributions, 
which are assembled along the following five themes: (I) poverty as a social rela-
tion; (II) epistemic injustices in poverty research; (III) the social context of poverty; 
(IV) measuring multidimensional poverty; and (V) country cases.
Keywords Poverty · Concept of poverty  · Multidimensional poverty · Poverty 
measurement  · Epistemic injustice · Social activism 
1  The Importance of Interdisciplinary Poverty Research
As we enter the 2020s, a large part of humanity still lives in dire poverty. While 
there has been a spectacular increase of resources at the top of the income spectrum 
over the last few decades, economic improvements for the less and least well-off 
have lagged behind. How we judge the success of past and current efforts at poverty 
alleviation depends not only on what can be legitimately expected, but also on the 
methodologies we use to measure poverty. According to the World Bank, the pro-
portion of the world’s “extremely poor”, narrowly defined as those who live on less 
than US$ 1.90 a day (with 2011 purchasing power parity levels), has dropped sig-
nificantly over the last decades. However, this monetary baseline is widely regarded 
as too low, which is now implicitly conceded even by its creators (see World Bank 
2018, pp. 67 ff.). Nevertheless, the number of people below this lowest of bench-
marks still remains in the hundreds of millions, and has in fact increased in some 
regions of the world, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (ibid., p. 2). Furthermore, 
it is now estimated that the goal of the complete eradication of extreme poverty, 
enshrined in the UN’s 2030 agenda, will not be met—at least not without radical 
policy changes in the affected regions (ibid., p. 3). This forecast does not account for 
additional goals, such as the reduction of relative and multidimensional poverty, 
which is implied by the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 of “end[ing] pov-
erty in all its forms everywhere”. The gravity and persistence of poverty can be 
revealed by applying slightly higher monetary benchmarks. In 2015, a quarter of the 
world’s population was living on less than US$ 3.20 a day, while almost half were 
living on less than US$ 5.50 a day (ibid., p. 67).
Poverty is widely regarded as a socioeconomic injustice that requires resolute 
alleviation measures coordinated through political action. Determining the nature 
and extent of absolute and relative poverty within and across states is crucial, since 
our definition and understanding of poverty inform policy and motivate political 
action. However, poverty measurement is an unexpectedly contested issue. The 
complex technicalities of measurement efforts are only one side of the story. The 
other is that “poverty” is a genuinely normative term: Judgments that refer to 
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evaluative one, besides which they are often combined with prescriptions about 
who should do what to alleviate poverty. The disagreements begin with defining 
poverty itself. Poverty may be defined broadly as an economic deficiency that 
causes deprivations in well-being. But this definition is not yet operational, and 
disguises a range of more substantive normative controversies. It leaves open pre-
cisely which deprivations in well-being are necessary for a person or a subpopula-
tion to be considered poor, as not all deprivations will be deemed relevant. For 
example, if a person does not enjoy unrestrained access to clean outdoor air due to 
pervasive man-made environmental pollution, then she is severely deprived in well- 
being, but she will not necessarily be considered poor; she might for example be 
affluent and therefore able to buy an air filtration device for her home, in contrast to 
people with lower incomes who cannot purchase such devices, or those who lack 
shelter altogether. Poverty occurs in historically changing social contexts, which 
necessitates continuous reinterpretation of what it means to be poor in these con-
texts. What will be regarded as poverty is at least in part dependent on what is cus-
tomary in a given society. While according to Adam Smith’s famous observation, 
being able to purchase a linen shirt was necessary to appear in public without shame 
in his time (see Smith 1976 [1776], book 4, ch. 2), the customs of present societies 
necessitate access to a different range of material goods in order to avoid similar 
social stigmatization.
One of the more momentous insights for those engaged in poverty research is 
that determining the nature and extent of poverty in the world is a truly interdisci-
plinary challenge. Researchers of different disciplines are mutually reliant on one 
another. On the one hand, empirical poverty research should be informed by sound 
methodologies that include transparent conceptual and normative assumptions. 
Professional philosophers who are trained in analysing and justifying normative 
concepts can contribute to this task. On the other hand, philosophical research on 
poverty must not be a purely abstract undertaking, detached from empirical research. 
Philosophers must take into account evidence about the varied forms of deprivation 
that occur within different social contexts, including the perceptions and evaluations 
of people who are affected by these deprivations.
With this anthology, we seek to advance the interdisciplinary debate on poverty 
by focussing on its conceptualization and measurement, on the epistemic injustices 
in poverty research, and on poverty-related social activism. The unifying theme 
connecting this volume’s contributions is that poverty needs to be understood not 
only as a multidimensional, but also as a socially relational phenomenon, and that 
this dual understanding can improve existing efforts toward measuring and alleviat-
ing poverty. In order to advance the debate on poverty, we provide a forum for much 
needed dialogue between philosophers and more empirically oriented researchers, 
because philosophically sound analysis of and truly global research on poverty’s 
social embeddedness must go hand in hand. This book gathers original articles by 
eminent scholars, whose earlier studies have been formative for poverty research, 
but also by younger researchers with diverse scientific, cultural and geographical 
backgrounds, including scholars from the Global South, whose voices have been 
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in a double sense: Not only do its contributors come from different disciplines, 
including philosophy, development economics, political science and sociology, but 
many of the contributions to this volume are also interdisciplinary in themselves, 
including both reflection on the philosophical (conceptual and normative) aspects of 
poverty, and empirical research. Furthermore, several contributions can be consid-
ered transdisciplinary as their authors draw from their expertise of discussing and 
shaping poverty metrics in dialogue with policy-makers (see Alkire this volume; 
Burchi et al. this volume; Dotter and Klasen this volume; Godinot and Walker this 
volume; Reddy this volume; and Wolff this volume).
Towards the end of this introduction, we will preview the volume’s structure and 
content in more detail (see Sect. 3). Beforehand, we will provide some background 
knowledge by giving an overview of formative debates in poverty research (see 
Sect. 2a–c). These debates are aligned with three themes, namely: (a) conceptual-
izing and measuring poverty in different societies and across the world; (b) epis-
temic asymmetries in global poverty research; and (c) responsibilities for addressing 
poverty, including reflections on the specific responsibilities of academics engaged 
in poverty research.
2  Formative Debates in Poverty Research
 (a) The conceptualization and measurement of poverty
Adequately measuring poverty requires not only reliable data, but also a sound 
methodology that includes a plausible poverty metric. Such a metric should be 
based on a justifiable normative theory of what exactly people in poverty lack (in 
virtue of being poor). It is an evaluative standard that allows classification of those 
who are poor within different social contexts (be it in specific societies or the world 
at large). A poverty metric can be based on an absolute threshold standard or on a 
relative standard that defines poverty by referencing levels of well-being in a given 
society. These standards can be measured in either purely monetary terms or more 
broadly by referencing non-monetary indicators as well.
Monetary metrics still constitute the most well-known type of poverty standard. 
According to monetary metrics, a person is poor if their income or consumption 
expenditures fall below a certain limit, which can be a fixed number, or a ratio based 
on the level of economic prosperity within a social context. Monetary metrics are 
standardly applied in national contexts, but the most well-known contemporary 
1 Most contributions to this volume are based on presentations given at the conference “Dimensions 
of Poverty”, which took place at the Haus der Kulturen der Welt (HKW) in June 2017 in Berlin. 
More than 30 presentations were selected following an open and international call for papers 
which resulted in over 100 submissions from 33 countries on six continents. The conference was 
generously sponsored by the HKW and the Centre for Advanced Studies “Justitia Amplificata”, 
funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
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and alternatively referred to as “international poverty lines”. In the year of 1990, the 
Bank originally set a US$ 1 a day threshold in their estimates of the total number of 
people who live in extreme poverty worldwide. It has adjusted this lowest interna-
tional poverty line over the years—to US$ 1.25 a day in 2008 and to US$ 1.90 a day 
in 2015. The World Bank has asserted that these adjustments, intended to account 
for newly available data and changes in purchasing power, provide for continuity, so 
that estimates of increases and decreases of the number of persons who live in 
extreme poverty remain consistent over time.
However, the explanatory power of the World Bank’s monetary measure has 
been drawn into doubt. Several lines of criticism can be distinguished.2 To start 
with, it has been argued that the World Bank’s methodology does not allow for con-
sistent estimates of the decreases or increases of poverty over time, and that the 
number of extremely poor people is calculated with unrepresentative baskets of 
goods that yield inaccurate purchasing power parities. It has also been objected that 
the World Bank’s numbers are based on household surveys, which obscure inequali-
ties in the distribution of resources within households—usually to the detriment of 
women and children. Furthermore, it has been argued that the World Bank’s poverty 
line is too low, leading to a general underestimation of the extent of extreme poverty 
in the world.3 A final criticism is that even the most reliable information about indi-
viduals’ income and purchasing power only allows for limited conclusions about 
the quality of the life these individuals enjoy, as innate individual differences as well 
as differences in social, geographical and cultural environments have a considerable 
influence on the financial resources needed to lead a minimally good life.
This last criticism concerns not only the World Bank’s global poverty measures, 
but all monetary standards, including those designed to measure relative income 
poverty. The latter standards typically classify those as relatively poor whose income 
is below 50% or 60% of the median in a given context. This type of poverty measure 
is sometimes criticized for not being universally applicable. Imagine a well- educated 
and materially abundant society, in which all members have high incomes. Now 
suppose the incomes of half of the population increase by 50% over the course of 
10 years—say, due to a rise in shares of a private pension fund—while the incomes 
of the other half have stagnated. While there is an increase in inequality, the above 
monetary measure for relative income poverty suggests that there is also an increase 
in poverty, which might seem counterintuitive. The upshot is that poverty should be 
conceptually distinguished from economic inequality (see Sen 1981, p. 15). This 
does not mean that poverty does not have a comparative dimension, nor that eco-
nomic inequalities are unproblematic. Since some forms of material inequality 
result in problematic forms of social exclusion, poverty measurement should gener-
ally take into account relative deprivations next to absolute ones, even if the latter 
2 For more extensive discussion of the following criticisms, see Reddy and Pogge (2010), Wisor 
et al. (2014), Reddy and Lahoti (2016), and Reddy (this volume).
3 See references given in fn. 2, and Hickel (2016); see World Bank (2018) for the introduction of 
more expansive monetary measures.
 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Poverty Measurement, Epistemic Injustices…
6constitute the core of the phenomenon (ibid., p. 17). More crucially still, monetary 
indicators should not be taken as the sole measures of poverty, because we must take 
into account a range of aspects that cannot easily be captured in monetary terms; 
these include access to and enjoyment of adequate food and clothing, clean air and 
drinking water, healthcare and education, and political participation. Implicitly mul-
tidimensional poverty measures have been around for a long time (see e.g. Booth 
1903, Rowntree 1901, and Townsend 1954, 1979). More recently, Amartya Sen has 
provided one of the most forceful and influential critiques of purely monetary 
understandings of poverty. In collaboration with Martha Nussbaum, he developed 
the capability approach (see e.g. Sen 1999, Nussbaum 2000) and thus paved the 
way for broad acceptance of multidimensional understandings of poverty. The capa-
bility approach can be used as a normative framework for the measurement not only 
of poverty, but of human well-being more generally. It competes with a range of 
other such conceptual frameworks, including welfarist, needs-based and goods- 
based standards.
Welfarism takes individual utility (or happiness, or pleasure, in older formula-
tions) as the elementary unit of measurement, as in utilitarian doctrines. This is 
problematic for the capability theorist due to the predominantly subjective under-
standing of utility. Humans generally adapt their preferences and conceptions of the 
good life to their specific circumstances, and those living at or close to the subsis-
tence level are known to adapt to the adverse conditions that they face by lowering 
their expectations (known by development economists as the “problem of adaptive 
preferences”). Even in the absence of external coercion, poor peoples’ choices 
between alternate options are gravely constrained (see e.g. Sen 1999, ch. 3). It is not 
enough to look at mental states in terms of subjective preference fulfilment in order 
to measure their quality of life. What’s needed is a more reliable, objective measure. 
For Sen and Nussbaum, human capabilities are the preferable metric, understood as 
opportunities for realizing certain objectively valuable functionings, such as: being 
adequately nourished; being educated; being assisted by medical professionals in a 
situation of need; and leading a long and healthy life, among many other things that 
humans are or do. The capability approach does not say that people must fulfil all 
these intrinsically and instrumentally valuable functionings, but that it should be at 
least possible for them to do so if they wish (in the sense of possessing correspond-
ing positive freedoms). For example, those who voluntarily fast or participate in a 
hunger strike, such as Ghandi, have the capacity to nourish themselves adequately, 
but choose not to. This sets them apart from hundreds of millions of chronically 
undernourished humans who are unable to escape their state of extreme deprivation 
due to external circumstances (see e.g. Sen 1999, and Nussbaum 2011, p. 25). The 
capability approach defines poverty as deprivation of the ability to achieve function-
ings that are central to a good life (see Sen 1999, ch. 4).
Needs-based approaches can overlap significantly with the capability approach, 
if needs are understood not subjectively, but as objective requirements for a good 
life (see e.g. Brock 1998). However, within needs-based approaches, there seems to 
be a lack of comparable emphasis on the freedoms to achieve objectively valuable 
functionings. A possible objection is that putting the concepts of needs (as opposed 
V. Beck et al.
7to that of capabilities) at the centre can lead to a problematic demotion of human 
beings to passive recipients of care. For what ultimately seems to matter in poverty 
alleviation is not only that people function well and satisfy their needs, but that they 
become able do so out of their own efforts.
Goods-based approaches propose to measure well-being in terms of the avail-
ability of certain bundles of material or immaterial “goods” or “resources”. A prom-
inent example is Rawls’s social primary goods, understood as all-purpose goods for 
pursuing different rational life plans (see Rawls 1999 [1971], pp. 78–81 and ch. VII) 
or, in other words, “things that rational persons want whatever else they want” 
(ibid., p. xiii). Rawls’s primary goods metric also fulfils the requirement of multidi-
mensionality, because it includes not only material goods, such as income and 
wealth, but also immaterial goods, such as social and political rights, basic free-
doms, professional opportunities and the social bases of self-respect. However, 
capability theorists have argued that the primary goods metric is not sensitive 
enough to the differing abilities of individuals to convert these goods into valuable 
functionings. For example, someone with a physical disability that prevents them 
from walking would require a different set of material goods to achieve mobility 
than someone without such a disability. In return, the primary goods metric is some-
times defended by saying that it provides a theory of the good that fulfils the neutral-
ity requirements for liberal societies, while the capability approach requires working 
with an essentialist hierarchy of capabilities. However, while Nussbaum has pro-
posed a concrete list of capabilities (see e.g. Nussbaum 2011, 33 f.), Sen has in fact 
emphasized the central role of public reasoning for concretizing and applying the 
capability approach (see e.g. Sen 2009).
Despite the fundamental differences between the aforementioned philosophical 
views on how to measure well-being, there is room for a consensus on at least some 
poverty-related questions. Different accounts, including refined versions of needs- 
based, goods-based and capability approaches, can all live up to the desideratum of 
multidimensionality. They all advise developing poverty measures that mirror 
important dimensions, which arguably include health, education, standard of living, 
political participation and financial security. They can also agree on more practical 
matters, such as that social institutions must provide safe access to various instru-
mental goods, which in turn allows for the realization of basic capabilities and the 
fulfilment of elementary needs. The aforementioned theories only diverge when it 
comes to which of these three aspects should constitute the fundamental unit for 
measuring human well-being and poverty. Methodologies for measuring poverty 
always involve normative assumptions. As such, these assumptions will likely 
remain contested to some extent, but there are still more and less plausible views of 
what kinds of human deprivation are constitutive of poverty.
It is one thing to determine the right fundamental metric for poverty measure-
ment, and another to draw conclusions about how to improve existing poverty mea-
sures for different social contexts. It has already been suggested that developing 
justifiable multidimensional poverty measures is a socially important exercise 
which can guide more effective poverty alleviation. The above-mentioned criticisms 
of the World Bank’s global poverty measure do not imply, however, that monetary 
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sures must be based on normatively plausible and transparent assumptions (see 
Reddy this volume), so that indicators for income and purchasing power are more 
informative instruments for policy design. Second, gathering reliable and method-
ologically sound data on income poverty is not the whole story. Rather, these indica-
tors must be complemented and integrated with comprehensive non-monetary 
indicators for poverty’s various dimensions. In a recent report, the World Bank 
acknowledged both of these general concerns (see World Bank 2018). More specifi-
cally, it now concedes that the following three things are important: (i) going beyond 
monetary measures and working with a broader understanding of poverty (ibid., ch. 
4); (ii) measuring monetary poverty beyond the unit of household income and gath-
ering data that actually allows this (ibid., ch. 5); and (iii) working with higher stan-
dards of monetary poverty that complement the very low threshold of US$ 1.90 per 
day (ibid., ch. 3).
Next to the more foundational theoretical questions and controversies, there are 
also various practical challenges for poverty measurement. One of those challenges 
is gathering reliable and comprehensive data on capabilities, which is significantly 
more difficult than gathering data on related functionings, and much more difficult 
than collecting data on related resources. Such difficulties will more likely present 
themselves in some dimensions than in others, as for example in the education 
dimension (see Dotter and Klasen this volume). Those engaged in poverty research 
must take such practical difficulties into account when designing poverty measures. 
The contributions to this volume by those who focus on the more technical side of 
poverty measurement––some of whom have been at the forefront of the debate on 
poverty measurement––are reflective of such challenges (see also Sect. 3 in this 
introduction, and the contributions in Part IV of this volume).
There are by now several established poverty indexes that have been developed 
in response to the plea for multidimensional poverty measurement. The Human 
Development Index (HDI), developed by Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq, consti-
tuted an early attempt to move beyond purely economic assessments of human 
development. The HDI is a composite index that ranks a country’s level of develop-
ment along the dimensions of life expectancy, education and per capita income. It 
has been used in the Human Development Report (HDR), launched by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) on the initiative of Sen and ul Haq. In 
2010, the HDR used a new composite index, named the Inequality-Adjusted Human 
Development Index (IHDI), which derives from the HDI but accounts for country- 
wide inequalities in health, education and incomes. The Human Poverty Index 
(HPI), on the other hand, focusses more specifically on deprivations in health, edu-
cation and income at the level of countries, and was first introduced as a comple-
ment to the HDI in 1997’s HDR.
In 2010, the HPI was replaced by the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(MPI), which was developed by the Oxford Human Development Initiative 
(OPHI)––led by Sabina Alkire (see Alkire this volume) and James Foster––and the 
UNDP. The global MPI currently covers 105 countries or 77% of the world’s popu-
lation (representing 5.7 billion people), 23% or 1.3 billion of whom were catego-
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ten indicators that mirror the HDI’s and MPI’s three poverty dimensions, namely 
health, education and living standards. The MPI currently represents the most dif-
ferentiated global poverty measure and has undergone regular updates and a more 
extensive revision in 2018 to adapt it more closely to the SDGs (see Alkire et al. 
2018). Next to the global MPI, which currently allows for comparisons of poverty 
across 105 countries, there are also national MPIs, which are based on the same 
methodology, but which more closely reflect the particularities of the specific coun-
tries that are covered.
The above-mentioned indexes have contributed to a more profound understand-
ing of the challenges related to poverty alleviation. Unsurprisingly, they have also 
been met with criticism on conceptual, normative and technical grounds, which 
have in part contributed to further modification, revision and refinement. The MPI 
is no exception. It has been argued that it excludes relevant indicators and dimen-
sions of human deprivation, does not measure poverty at the individual level, uses 
arbitrary cut-off points and does not use adequately grounded participatory research 
that is sensitive to the views of the poor (see Wisor et al. 2014, Burchi et al. this 
volume, Chimakonam this volume, and Godinot and Walker this volume). In the 
MPI’s defence it should be noted that some of these problems stem partly from the 
need to use existing datasets on poverty, which must be comparable across countries 
in the case of the global MPI. Better and more comprehensive data on the lives of 
the poor could in future lead to a more plausible and comprehensive MPI. Several 
contributions to this volume discuss these concerns in much more detail, on concep-
tual, normative, discursive and technical grounds (Brando and Pitasse Fragoso this 
volume; Burchi et al. this volume; Chimakonam this volume; Dübgen this volume; 
Godinot and Walker this volume; and Hassoun et al. this volume). Their underlying 
goal is to continue to improve our understanding of multidimensional poverty, so 
that refined multidimensional indexes may provide even more useful complemen-
tary frameworks next to monetary measures (see Parts II and IV in this volume).
 (b) Research methodologies and epistemic injustices
Poverty measurement within and across countries not only requires working with 
justifiable normative assumptions. It also involves gathering empirical data on how 
individuals fare along poverty’s various dimensions. Empirical research should not 
merely come into play after the determination of poverty indicators; it should play 
a central role at the earlier stage of designing poverty indexes for different social 
contexts, because this requires taking account of the particular social conditions of 
the context in which poverty is measured. Several philosophical insights speak in 
favour of such an approach. We have already referred to Adam Smith’s more general 
observation that in order to understand poverty one must take note of social customs 
(see Sect. 2a). Amartya Sen argued in a similar vein, but with more systematic preci-
sion, that “absolute deprivation in terms of a person’s capabilities relates to relative 
deprivation in terms of commodities, income and resources” (Sen 1983, p.  153 
[italicized as in the original]; see also Dotter and Klasen this volume, and Reddy 
this volume). Researchers must therefore empirically determine the extent to which 
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various kinds of deprivation in different poverty dimensions translate into relative 
resource deprivations in a given social context. On a more fundamental level, pov-
erty researchers must also take into account that any selection, description and pre-
sentation of data is necessarily value-laden (see e.g. Longino 1990).
The selection of poverty dimensions, as well as their indicators, should be an 
object of ongoing research. Critics of the MPI, for example, have argued that its 
selection of dimensions and indicators is not based on a comprehensive and 
 justifiable conception of poverty, but is rather reflective of contingent data avail-
ability (Wisor et al. 2014, Burchi et al. this volume; Godinot and Walker this vol-
ume; and Brando and Pitasse  Fragoso this volume). From a philosophical 
perspective, incomplete data should of course not be allowed to determine the struc-
ture of a poverty index. Rather, such an index must be based on a sound and com-
prehensive conception of poverty which may very well require collecting new data. 
This need for a normative grounding does not imply, however, that a sound index 
could be derived by purely philosophical reasoning alone (as opposed to being 
mostly data-driven). In fact, empirical poverty research that is focussed on the full 
range of poverty- related deprivations in a given context, as well as on the views of 
those who live in poverty, is of central importance even on this most fundamental 
level of poverty research. There are different methods that allow researchers to gen-
erate indices along different poverty dimensions and to take into account the con-
text-relative requirements for the realization of capabilities and functionings in 
these dimensions. Among the proposed methods are4: survey-based approaches, 
such as in the World Values Survey; public-consensus building, as proposed in the 
processes leading up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 and 
the SDGs in 2015; participatory poverty assessment, such as that conducted by the 
“Voices of the Poor” project (see Narayan et al. 2000; for another more recent par-
ticipatory approach, see Godinot and Walker this volume); and the constitutional 
approach, which seeks to derive information about poverty dimensions from the 
content of selected constitutions (see Burchi et al. this volume). Linares and Su (this 
volume) propose employment of financial diaries as a complementary method 
which allows for a better understanding of local cultural and societal dynamics that 
are hidden in national statistics. Last but not least, country studies, which focus on 
specific characteristics of a given social context, will of course remain an important 
form of poverty research (for three different cases, see: Linares and Su this volume; 
Mpenya et al. this volume; and Keskin this volume). Researchers will continue to 
debate the relative merits and potential combinations of such approaches to deter-
mining the dimensions of poverty. What is certain is that empirical methods need to 
have a firm normative grounding, for which conceptual analysis and programmatic 
ideas––such as Sen’s plea that poverty-relevant capabilities should be determined 
via processes of public reasoning––will continue to be relevant.
Beyond methodological questions of research design, these considerations also 
show that poverty research must be genuinely global in nature, and not just in terms 
4 For an overview on the first three types of approaches, among others, see Alkire 2007.
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of more comprehensively taking into account the needs and capabilities of the poor 
across the world. Poverty research must also be more inclusive in terms of who 
conducts it, as the present exclusion of the views of scholars from the Global South 
arguably constitutes an epistemic injustice. According to Miranda Fricker, we can 
distinguish two kinds of epistemic injustice, namely testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustices. The former occur whenever a speaker’s credibility is undervalued due to 
a morally arbitrary feature such as skin colour or gender, whereas the latter occur at 
a prior level, insofar as a knower suffers from a lack of collective interpretive 
resources that would cognitively allow her to analyse a given injustice (see Fricker 
2007). Some contributions (in particular Chimakonam this volume and Dübgen this 
volume) reflect on how the concept of epistemic injustice can be applied to the issue 
of asymmetries in poverty research. Furthermore, the pluralistic composition of this 
volume should be seen as an attempt to address such epistemic asymmetries. 
Demands that these injustices be remedied apply to philosophers and to more 
empirically oriented scientists alike. Although we, the editors of this volume, are all 
based in the Global North, we have strived to give space to views from scholars 
from the Global South. This is not only a question of fairness, we think, but also 
highly instructive because they address marginalized topics in their own voice (see 
Sect. 3 below, and in particular Chimakonam this volume and Omotoso this volume).
 (c) Responsibilities for poverty alleviation
In the last three decades, moral and political theorists have increasingly worked 
with the assumption that the responsibility to alleviate poverty is dependent on the 
content, scope and weight of norms of social justice. We live in a world that is eco-
nomically and ecologically highly interdependent—the worsening climate crisis is 
only the most evident example of this fact. The deprivations of the global poor are 
causally connected to the shape of political and economic institutions in other con-
texts, including international institutions related to trade, security and the environ-
ment. If poverty is at least in part a result of the institutional design of our current 
world order, and if this design constitutes a global injustice, then responsibilities to 
alleviate poverty should not only be conceived on purely humanitarian grounds. 
Rather, all those who are implicated in or even complicit in these injustices, includ-
ing the world’s affluent people, also have justice-related obligations to address pov-
erty, additional to their humanitarian obligations. The debate on the content, scope 
and weight of justice-related and humanitarian responsibilities within and across 
borders is already quite voluminous (see e.g. Pogge and Moellendorf 2008, Brooks 
2008, Young 2011). We therefore do not wish to repeat the core debate in this vol-
ume. Instead, we would like to accommodate more specific interventions regarding 
the responsibility for addressing poverty in different contexts. One such aspect is 
the importance of tying questions of responsibility to those of conceptualizing and 
measuring poverty (see Lepenies this volume, and Putnam this volume). Furthermore, 
some of the contributions in this volume conceptualize and problematize the content 
of “philanthropic” responsibilities for poverty alleviation (see Illingworth this vol-
ume, and Mahlert this volume). Last but not least, there is a need for reflection on 
how to conceive of the role of political theorists themselves with respect to global 
 Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Poverty Measurement, Epistemic Injustices…
12
poverty alleviation (see Sengupta this volume). Many philosophers and normative 
theorists aim to reconcile their academic and political responsibilities.5 As a result, 
some political philosophers have become advocates for political change and 
 ultimately political activists themselves. One may therefore wonder if there is a 
deeper or even necessary correlation between normative analysis and political 
engagement.
3  Previewing the Volume’s Structure and Content
After having given an overview of the anthology’s discursive context and central 
themes, we now introduce its structure and content in more detail. The book is 
divided in five parts: The contributions in Part I are dedicated to the issue of poverty 
as a social relation; Part II contains reflections on neglected views and epistemic 
injustices in poverty research; Part III’s contributions discuss the importance of the 
social context for poverty research; the contributions in Part IV are dedicated to the 
measurement of multidimensional poverty within development economics; Part V 
contains three different country studies.
3.1  Part I: Poverty as a Social Relation
The contributions by Wolff, Putnam and P.  Lepenies all engage with different 
themes related to the task of understanding poverty as a socially relational concept. 
The plea for such a relational understanding has roots in the history of Western 
social and political thought, as detailed by Wolff (this volume) and Lepenies (this 
volume), but can also be associated with the contemporary debate about social egal-
itarianism in moral and political theory (see e.g. Fourie et al. 2015, and Hull 2015). 
Some argue that a relational egalitarian approach also underlies the African philoso-
phy of Ubuntu (see Oelofsen 2018). According to this strand of normative theory, 
realizing “social equality”––or “relational equality”, as it is also called––does not 
simply require equal distributions of material and immaterial goods, rights, and 
freedoms in a given context. Rather, the demand of equal treatment is interpreted as 
requiring the realization of egalitarian social relationships on a more fundamental 
level, which creates certain demands on the distributional level. The social egalitar-
ian perspective can also yield a deeper and more compelling analysis of poverty, 
according to which poverty is not simply a lack of financial resources (see Sect. 2a 
above). Instead, we must develop a thorough understanding of how economic depri-
5 This is reflected in two more recent philosophical movements: effective altruism (see e.g. Singer 
2015) and Academics Stand Against Poverty (see e.g. Pogge and Cabrera 2012).
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vations affect social relationships in various negative ways, without neglecting 
monetary indicators altogether.
In “Beyond Poverty”, Jonathan Wolff (this volume) builds on insights from his 
own earlier works (see Wolff and de-Shalit 2007, Wolff 2015a, b) and argues that a 
conceptual and pragmatic focus on the alleviation of monetary poverty is insuffi-
cient, because it fails to fully capture the precarious social position of people living 
in poverty. However, working with a narrower concept of poverty alleviation—such 
as raising incomes—remains helpful, as it facilitates political consensus about the 
implementation of poverty alleviation measures. In “Poverty as a Social Relation”, 
Daniel Putnam (this volume) argues that understanding poverty as a social relation 
requires focussing on threats to valuable interpersonal relationships. Further, he 
reflects on how the range of relational disadvantages that poor people suffer gener-
ates, first, general obligations of justice to invest in social capital and relational 
goods, and second, more specific poverty-related obligations of academics. In 
“Metrics, Politics and Definitions”, Philipp Lepenies (this volume) argues that mod-
ern efforts to measure poverty have had the unintended effect of narrowing and 
“de-socializing” the common understanding of poverty. He contends that an empha-
sis on absolute poverty remains hegemonic, despite important treatments of poverty 
as a genuinely relational and socially relative phenomenon, as in the works of Georg 
Simmel or Peter Townsend.
3.2  Part II: Epistemic Injustices in Poverty Research
This part of the book assembles contributions by Dübgen, Chimakonam, Omotoso 
and Sengupta, which shed light on various epistemic injustices in the debate on 
global poverty. These contributions bring so-called Northern and Southern perspec-
tives into a fruitful dialogue. Both testimonial and hermeneutical injustices (see 
Sect. 2b above) occur in academic and in more general debates on global poverty, 
neither of which are sufficiently globalized yet. Whether in policy debates or on the 
editorial boards of highly regarded academic journals, voices and perspectives from 
the Global South are often sidelined. It is highly problematic that those who live in 
global poverty remain largely excluded from its conceptualization. This exclusion 
also applies to the production of knowledge about effective means of poverty reduc-
tion. On the other hand, activists from the Global North are often suspected of pur-
suing Western interests (see the discussion in Sengupta this volume). We need 
participatory approaches that not only include the voices of the poor but make them 
agents of poverty research in their own right, agents who make an essential contri-
bution to the conceptualization, measurement and possible eradication of poverty 
(see e.g. Laderchi et al. 2006, and Godinot and Walker this volume). The multi- 
perspectivity of this volume can itself be regarded as a modest contribution to epis-
temic justice in poverty research.
In “Scientific Ghettos and Beyond”, Franziska Dübgen (this volume) discusses 
in detail how researchers from the Global South are structurally excluded from 
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global knowledge production and how this constitutes a major epistemic injustice. 
Dübgen expects that epistemic justice in poverty research is not only an end in 
itself, as it is required in terms of internal fairness, but that eradicating such injus-
tices would also increase the quality of global knowledge production. In “Is the 
debate on poverty research a global one?”, Jonathan Chimakonam (this volume) 
reflects on epistemic injustices in global poverty research and examines a concrete 
case, namely the exclusion of the Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka from academic 
exchange. Chimakonam then turns to the constructive idea of conversational 
 thinking, found in African philosophy, defined as an inclusive, fair, horizontal and 
intercultural engagement for a truly global poverty discourse. In “Hairiness and 
Hairlessness: An African Feminist view of Poverty”, Sharon Omotoso (this volume) 
reflects on “intellectual poverty”, conceptualized as a lack of sufficient education to 
develop viable ideas for one’s own life and society. Omotoso analyses different 
class-related manifestations of “intellectual poverty” and discusses measures such 
as joint knowledge production and the overcoming of class protectionism, which 
could unite differently affected social groups in the fight against poverty. In “Western 
Academic Activism and Poverty Research”, Mitu Sengupta (this volume) reflects 
on the accusation by post-development critics that Western activism aimed at social 
and political change in the Global South is at best paternalistic and self- aggrandizing, 
and at worst represents a relapse into colonial power structures. However, Sengupta 
argues that the valid concerns of post-development critics basically require more 
and not less activism on the part of Western scholars, namely activism of the correct, 
cooperative kind.
3.3  Part III: Poverty in Context
It means something different to be poor in Africa, Asia or Europe, and it matters 
what social position poor people hold vis-à-vis rich people, the state, global institu-
tions or potential benefactors. As it turns out, the social and political context plays 
a decisive role in determining what poverty is, what kinds of data are relevant and 
what policies will contribute effectively to its alleviation. The contributions to the 
third part of this volume, by Illingworth, Schweiger and Mahlert, reflect the rele-
vance of the social and political context for the conceptualization, measurement and 
alleviation of poverty.
In “Giving Well: Philanthropy for Human Rights”, Patricia Illingworth (this vol-
ume) stresses the importance of political and ultimately juridical solutions to the 
global poverty problem and argues that non-state actors, including business actors 
and philanthropists, should donate to sectors and charitable organisations that 
address structural human rights deficiencies, in accordance with their “social licence 
to operate”. Illingworth focusses on the human right to health, because efforts to 
protect it represent a very effective way to fight poverty. In “Absolute Poverty in 
Europe—What can it mean?”, Gottfried Schweiger (this volume) reflects on the fact 
that even in Europe, there are people—like the sans-papiers and the homeless—who 
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would be poor in any society imaginable, because they have too little social security 
and visibility to lead a life that is respectable in any way. For him the phenomenon 
of absolute poverty in Europe is reproduced by practices of exclusion, stigmatiza-
tion and domination, practices that effective policies must target. In “Poverty, 
Richness, and Aid: A Conceptual Proposal”, Bettina Mahlert (this volume) takes 
into account how social categories such as deprivation, lack, and scarcity—and 
wealth and abundance as their opposites—not only mark social asymmetries but can 
also contribute to reproducing them. Mahlert argues against the tendency to describe 
poverty and wealth in binary terms, and proposes to integrate positive classifications 
into the description of multidimensional deprivation and the definition of wealth.
3.4  Part IV: Measuring Multidimensional Poverty
This part assembles the views of leading development economists and philosophers 
on current issues in poverty measurement. The contributions by Alkire; Reddy; 
Klasen and Dotter; Godinot and Walker; Burchi, Rippin and Montenegro; Brando 
and Pitasse Fragoso; and Hassoun, Herlitz and Esposito shed light on contemporary 
challenges related to the conception and practical use of various poverty indexes in 
development economics and politics (for more background on poverty measure-
ment, see Sect. 2a above).
In “Multidimensional Poverty Measures as Policy Tools”, Sabina Alkire (this 
volume) explains the composition of and central ideas behind the Multidimensional 
Poverty Index (MPI) and details how multidimensional indexes for different social 
contexts (different countries and globally) provide valuable information that should 
be used to improve poverty-related policy actions. The first SDG notably calls for 
ending poverty in all forms and dimensions––and Alkire argues in detail that the 
MPI represents a useful tool that can help policy makers to reach this goal. In 
“Poverty: Beyond Obscurantism”, Sanjay Reddy (this volume) argues that poverty 
measurement needs to be based on clear, transparent and appropriate evaluative 
standards, and that this requirement has not been met in three prominent contexts: 
(1) global income poverty measurement; (2) measurement of poverty in India; and 
(3) measurement of poverty in the United States. However, ex negativo, engaging 
with these three problematic examples reveals how obscurantism in poverty mea-
surement can be avoided and how more accountability can be achieved at the same 
time. In “An absolute multidimensional poverty measure in the functioning space 
(and relative measure in the resource space)”, Dotter and Klasen (this volume) argue 
that while some MPI indicators cannot be assessed in relative terms (e.g. health, as 
it reflects specific health functionings), education and standard of living metrics 
should be relative. Dotter and Klasen build on the UNDP’s Global MPI (Alkire and 
Santos 2014) and introduce adaptable (resource-related) indicator thresholds which 
can be fitted to prevailing standards in a given regional context. In “Poverty in All 
its Forms”, Godinot and Walker (this volume) propose a novel, transpositional, 
transdisciplinary and participatory methodology called “Merging of Knowledge”. 
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They argue that while multidimensional poverty indicators represent real progress 
over unidimensional ones, a different form of research is required to identify dimen-
sions of poverty based on experiential knowledge. In “The measurement of multidi-
mensional poverty across countries”, Burchi et  al. (this volume) argue for a 
“constitutional approach” (Burchi, De Muro and Kollar) as a theoretical framework 
for multidimensional poverty measurement. The idea behind this proposal is that 
the normative assumptions implicit in the construction of multidimensional indexes 
are to be justified through a systematic and comparative evaluation of national 
 constitutions, which yields a list of three dimensions for international comparisons 
of poverty, namely health, education and decent employment. In “Agency and the 
Relational Dimension of Poverty”, Brando and Pitasse Fragoso (this volume) dis-
cuss how poverty measurement requires context-sensitive methods. In comparing 
three multidimensional indexes (Human Poverty Index, Multidimensional Poverty 
Index and the York model), they argue that these models focus on certain forms of 
capability deprivation while overlooking others. In “Multidimensional Poverty 
Measurement: The Value of Life and the Challenge to Value Aggregation”, Nicole 
Hassoun et al. (this volume) discuss the necessity and pitfalls of trade-offs between 
different dimensions of poverty. The contributors argue that the value of life (implied 
in indexes related to life expectancy or child mortality) should not be simply set off 
against other dimensions.
3.5  Part V: Country Cases
This part of the book contains three country case studies from Africa, Europe and 
Asia, authored by Mpenya, Baye and Epo; Keskin; and Linares and Su. Each coun-
try case demonstrates the importance of a contextual perspective for poverty mea-
surement and evaluation, and shows how citizens, policy-makers and scholars are 
motivated to grasp the many dimensions of poverty for very different reasons. 
Whether it is asset endowments along ethnic stratifications in Cameroon, conditions 
of precarity of denizens in Germany, or patriarchal debt relationships in 
Bangladesh—each country study goes beyond an empirical investigation of poverty 
in a given context and links back to systematic questions of how multidimensional 
poverty should be conceptualized and measured.
In “Mapping Out Multiple Dimensions of Well-Being by Ethnicity in Rural 
Cameroon”, Mpenya et  al. (this volume) argue that it is necessary to investigate 
non-monetary dimensions of poverty in the African context, especially as they relate 
to ethnic groups. The authors look at different categories of asset endowments 
(financial, human, natural, physical, social) in order to compare indicators and track 
multiple dimensions of well-being along four main ethnic groups. In “Rising Tide 
of Precariat and Denizens in Neoliberal Capitalism: The Case of Germany”, Eda 
Keskin (this volume) describes a specific form of poverty in Germany, namely pre-
carity, defined as a socio-economic condition in which employment is uncertain or 
intermittent. In Keskin’s case study, it is shown that groups at high risk of precarity 
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encompass “denizens”: migrants, refugees and their children, and others lacking the 
full rights of citizens (Standing 2014), as well as young adults, single parents, sick 
or disabled individuals, and retired people, but also academics and working women. 
In “Measuring Capabilities: Using Financial Diaries in Bangladesh”, Linares and 
Su (this volume) argue that financial diaries can serve as a fitting methodological 
complement to multidimensional poverty analyses and statistics. Based on a case 
study in Kapasia, Bangladesh, they show how financial diaries serve as sociological 
tools that can provide a rich understanding of debt, transfer and gift networks that 
either augment or detract from people’s abilities to be and do different things.
The methodologies and views assembled in this anthology are rich and diverse. 
We dare to hope that this diversity and the interdisciplinarity of the volume will be 
considered a strength. After all, listening to the views and voices of those affected 
by poverty is key when it comes to advancing the debate on poverty, and that on 
political and economic efforts at poverty alleviation.
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